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Why some animals forgo reproduction in complex societies 
Abstract 
In complex societies, some animals forgo breeding and help others raise young. Although this behavior at 
first seems maladaptive, evolutionary biologists have developed theory that explains when and how it can 
evolve. For example, if it helps kin raise more young or if dispersing to breed elsewhere is risky, an 
individual may cooperate with nearby breeders. After two decades of work on the social behavior of coral 
reef fish, Peter Buston of Boston University and Marian Wong of University of Wollongong, Australia, have 
shown that this behavior can unfold under a third scenario: If conflict with dominant breeders is especially 
risky, then subordinates will politely wait their turn to breed, rather than risk a fight. Buston and Song 
explain their experimental and observational work in this feature, and then outline how their work 
influences current theory. 
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Charles Darwin’s On the Ori-gin of Species laid the founda-tions for evolutionary biolo-gy and understanding of life 
on Earth. Even as he was marshalling 
evidence for the theory of natural se-
lection, Darwin made a point of high-
lighting observations that seemed to 
challenge his ideas:
I… will confine myself to one 
special difficulty, which at first 
appeared to me insuperable, and 
actually fatal to my whole theory, 
I allude to the neuters or sterile 
females in insect communities: for 
these neuters often differ wide-
ly in instinct and structure from 
both the male and fertile females, 
and yet from being sterile they 
cannot propagate their kind.
In the insect societies that Darwin 
was alluding to, such as ants or ter-
mites, there is a reproductive division 
of labor: Some individuals forgo their 
own reproduction and help others re-
produce. To express Darwin’s special 
difficulty in modern terms, these so-
cieties are challenging to understand 
because it’s not immediately apparent 
how natural selection can preserve the 
genes that underlie nonbreeding and 
helping behaviors. Evolutionary biolo-
gists have puzzled over such coopera-
tive behaviors ever since Darwin high-
lighted the challenge that they present 
to the theory of natural selection.
Although the social insects present 
extreme cases of sociality, social birds 
and mammals exhibit similar, if less 
extreme, forms of sociality. Indeed, 
behavioral ecologist Paul W. Sherman 
of Cornell University and others have 
suggested that the difference between 
social insects and social vertebrates is 
only one of degree, the various forms 
of sociality lying on a continuum. For 
example, birds such as white-fronted 
bee-eaters (Merops bullockoides) and 
mammals such as naked mole rats (Het-
erocephalus glaber), also live in complex 
societies in which some individuals 
forgo reproduction and help others to 
reproduce, at least at some point in their 
lives. Anthropologist Sarah B. Hrdy of 
University of California, Davis, and oth-
ers have even argued that such coopera-
tive breeding may have been pivotal in 
human evolution—essential to support 
our long and unusual life histories. 
Social vertebrates have proven in-
valuable for developing and testing 
theories of social evolution—they of-
ten exhibit a high level of flexibility 
in behavior, which enables research-
ers to manipulate key variables and 
measure individual responses. In the 
1980s, Stephen T. Emlen of Cornell 
University presented an evolutionary 
framework for understanding non-
breeding and helping strategies, based 
on studies of cooperatively breeding 
birds and mammals (see the sidebar “An 
Evolutionary Framework for Cooperative 
Behavior” on page 293). This framework 
still guides much of today’s research. 
Emlen emphasized that, to understand 
cooperative breeding, there are two 
main questions to answer: First, why 
do individuals help; second, why don’t 
individuals disperse to breed else-
where? The first question focuses on 
the reproductive payoff that individu-
als accrue from their current actions, 
whereas the second focuses on the pay-
off associated with alternative actions. 
This framework focused attention on 
two major reasons that nonbreeding 
and helping behaviors would evolve: 
kin selection and ecological constraints.
Complex Societies of Coral Reef Fish
Because this evolutionary framework 
for understanding cooperative breed-
ing was developed based on studies 
of birds and mammals, it was unclear 
whether it extended more broadly to 
other groups of animals. To find out, 
we have spent the better part of two de-
cades studying the complex societies of 
two coral reef fishes: the clown anem-
onefish (Amphiprion percula), in Madang 
Lagoon, Papua New Guinea, and the 
emerald goby (Paragobiodon xanthoso-
mus), at Lizard Island, Australia. 
The societies of these fishes bear a 
striking resemblance to the complex 
societies of birds and mammals. In 
both species, groups of individuals 
are found in close association with in-
vertebrate hosts (anemones or corals) 
that provide the fish with protection 
from predators. Each host contains one 
group of fish, which is composed of a 
breeding pair and a small number of 
nonbreeders. Within each group there 
is a size-based dominance hierarchy: 
The breeders are the largest individu-
als, and the nonbreeders get progres-
sively smaller. These fishes, like many 
coral reef fishes, are hermaphroditic: 
Clown anemonefish can change sex 
from male to female; emerald gobies 
can change sex from female to male.
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Behaviors of coral reef fishes provide strong support for some major new ideas 
about the evolution of cooperation. 
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The aim of our work has been to 
use these fishes to test the robustness 
of the current framework for under-
standing the evolution of cooperative 
breeding and generate new insights 
into social evolution. Here, based on 
our work and that of others, we pres-
ent a simple but expanded evolution-
ary framework that captures two other 
major reasons that nonbreeding and 
helping behaviors would evolve.
Kin Selection in Birds and Mammals
The theory of kin selection, formalized 
by the evolutionary biologist William 
D. Hamilton in the 1960s, emphasiz-
es that there are two ways for indi-
viduals to pass their genes to the next 
generation— either directly, by produc-
ing their own offspring, or indirectly, 
by enhancing the offspring production 
of their relatives. Helping relatives can 
be favored by kin selection because the 
relatives’ offspring share copies of the 
helper’s genes. This hypothesis makes 
two critical predictions: First, helpers 
enhance the fitness of breeders; and 
second, helpers are closely related to 
breeders. 
In the late 1980s, studies of white-
fronted bee-eaters, a colonially nesting 
bird found in Kenya and Tanzania, pro-
vided support for both of these predic-
tions: Each additional helper results in 
the breeders raising, on average, half 
a chick more to fledging, and helpers 
tend to be the offspring of the breeders 
they help. There is now a large body of 
evidence showing that helpers enhance 
the fitness of close kin and, consequent-
ly, that kin selection helps to explain 
many of the cases of helping behavior 
observed in social birds and mammals.
Ecological Constraints in Vertebrates
The theory of ecological constraints, 
formalized by Emlen, emphasizes that 
two alternative options are available to 
individuals— either they can disperse 
to breed elsewhere or they can stay on 
their natal territory as nonbreeders and 
help rear siblings. Many factors can be 
encompassed by the umbrella term eco-
logical constraints: Staying can be favored 
if the habitat is saturated, meaning there 
are no high-quality habitat vacancies, 
Clown anemonefish live in complex societ-
ies, in which a small number of individuals 
forgo breeding. Groups are found in close 
association with sea anemones. The evolu-
tion of nonbreeding behavior has intrigued 
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or because it is dangerous to move be-
tween patches of suitable habitat. This 
hypothesis makes three predictions: 
First, individuals will stay as nonbreed-
ers when there is some ecological con-
straint; second, critically, the likelihood 
of individuals dispersing to breed else-
where will increase when the ecological 
constraint is relaxed; and, third, com-
petition for breeding positions will be 
intense when habitat vacancies arise. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
studies of naked mole rats, a subterra-
nean rodent found in Ethiopia, Somalia, 
and Kenya, provided observational sup-
port for the first and third predictions: 
Unpredictable food availability (large 
plant tubers) and hard arid soils re-
duce the reproductive payoff associated 
with dispersing, and competition for 
breeding vacancies following the death 
of a breeder is intense and sometimes 
bloody. Subsequent studies have yield-
ed considerable observational and ex-
perimental evidence for all three pre-
dictions, demonstrating that ecological 
constraints help explain many cases of 
nonbreeding. In birds and mammals, 
nonbreeding and helping behaviors of-
ten go hand in hand, because when an 
individual’s independent breeding op-
tions are poor it can stay home and help 
its relatives reproduce.
Kin Selection in Coral Reef Fishes
Guided by the evolutionary frame-
work, we began by investigating 
whether clownfish nonbreeders might 
forgo their own reproduction and help 
the breeders reproduce, thereby gain-
ing indirect genetic benefits. 
To test the predictions of this hy-
pothesis, we spent a year in Papua 
New Guinea, scuba diving every day, 
monitoring survival and reproduction 
in 71 groups of clownfish on two reefs. 
(This was as amazing as it sounds, but 
bouts of malaria and strange fungal 
infections mean that the experience is 
not for the faint-hearted). We comple-
mented this monitoring with an exper-
iment in which we removed all non-
breeders from 14 of the 71 groups and 
examined the effect of the removal on 
the fitness of breeders (see the schematic 
on the opposite page). 
After another couple of years spent 
compiling the data and conducting sta-
tistical analyses, we were faced with 
an intriguing result: The nonbreeders 
had no effect on the survival or repro-
duction of breeders. Further, genetic 
Social groups of white-fronted bee-eaters (left) and naked mole rats (right) include members 
that for a period do not breed but instead help group-mates raise young. Research on these 
birds and mammals, as well as others, has established that the evolution of these behaviors is 






Complex fish societies provide a new set 
of models for studying decision making in 
social animals. In the coral dwelling goby, 
such as the one pictured above, the male and 
female are similar in size and the nonbreed-
ers get progressively smaller (right). In clown 
anemonefish, the female is largest, the male 
is second largest, and the nonbreeders are 
progressively smaller (far right). Photograph 
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analyses showed that the nonbreeders 
were not closely related to the breeders, 
because they disperse from their natal 
territories as larvae very early in life. 
Taken together these null results indi-
cated something quite remarkable: Kin 
selection, one of the founding concepts 
of social evolution, would play no role 
in explaining these fishy societies.
Future Selection in Coral Reef Fishes
If nonbreeders are not gaining indirect 
genetic benefits, then they must be con-
tributing genetically to the next gen-
eration in some other way— otherwise 
their behavior would be weeded out by 
natural selection. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, based on their studies of 
the Florida scrub jay, the ornithologists 
Glen E. Woolfenden and John W. Fitz-
patrick emphasized the possibility that 
nonbreeders might accrue direct ben-
efits in the future, by inheriting the terri-
tory following the death of the breeders. 
The idea can be formalized in a manner 
directly analogous to kin selection (see 
the sidebar “A Modified Framework for Co-
operative Behavior” on page 295). 
To determine whether the behav-
ior of clownfish was favored by future 
selection, we tested two critical pre-
dictions: First, the largest nonbreeder 
from an anemone would inherit the 
territory when a dominant breeder 
died and left a breeding vacancy; 
and second, these breeding vacancies 
would not be usurped either by small-
er nonbreeders from the anemone or 
by nonbreeders from elsewhere.
We tested these predictions by moni-
toring 57 of the 71 groups and record-
ing which individuals from the popu-
lation filled breeding vacancies when 
they arose. We complemented these ob-
servations with an experiment in which 
we removed breeding males from 16 
groups on a third reef, and determined 
which individual from the 26 groups on 
that reef filled the breeding vacancy cre-
ated (see the schematic on page 294). 
The results were unambiguous: In all 
cases the largest nonbreeder from the 
anemone inherited the breeding vacan-
cy; in no case did the smaller individual 
from the anemone, or a nonbreeder 
from elsewhere, usurp the vacancy. 
Simply put, individuals form a perfect 
queue for breeding positions. These re-
sults are one of the clearest demonstra-
tions (not confounded by kin selection) 
that individuals will adopt nonbreeding 
positions solely because of the potential 
for reproductive success in the future. 
Ecological Constraints in Fishes
The benefits that nonbreeders gain 
from inheriting territories in the fu-
ture are necessary but not sufficient 
to explain their behavior. A complete 
understanding requires that we also 
explain why nonbreeders don’t dis-
perse to breed elsewhere. 
To determine whether their behav-
ior was favored because of ecological 
constraints we tested two critical pre-
dictions: First, the likelihood of disper-
sal would increase as the availability 
of suitable habitat increased; second, 
the likelihood of dispersal would de-
crease as the risks of movement in-
creased. We tested whether dispersal 
occurred when habitat became avail-
able by monitoring the 97 groups of 
clownfish, after removing males or 
nonbreeders from 30 of them to cre-
ate habitat vacancies. The manipulated 
groups could be as little as one meter 
or as much as 100 meters from their 
neighbors. In clownfish, no individu-
als dispersed between anemones even 









Experimental removal of nonbreeders does not reduce the number of eggs hatched by the 
breeding pair, and groups are not composed of close relatives, demonstrating that kin selec-
tion does not explain cooperative behavior in social groups of clownfish.
The evolution of cooperative behavior depends on the costs and benefits 
of cooperative and alternative actions for the donor and its relatives: Co-
operative behavior can be favored because of its beneficial effects on kin 
(called kin selection), and cooperative behavior can be favored because of 
the detrimental effects associated with alternative actions (called ecological 
constraints). The behavior favored by selection can be determined using the 
equation called Hamilton’s rule. In particular, the cooperative action i will be 
favored over the alternative action j if 
Xi  + ri Yi  > Xj + rj Yj 
where Xi (or Xj) is the number of offspring associated with donor’s ith (or 
jth) action, Yi (or Yj) is the recipient’s number of offspring, and r is the prob-
ability that the two individuals share a copy of a particular gene identical 
by descent. The r terms capture the effect of kin selection; the j terms cap-
ture the effect of ecological constraints. Hamilton’s theory of kin selection 
showed how altruism might evolve in groups of close kin and provided a 
solution to Darwin’s problem.
An Evolutionary Framework for Cooperative Behavior
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when habitat saturation was reduced 
in this manner. 
More compellingly, we complement-
ed this with an experiment using em-
erald gobies, in which we manipulated 
habitat saturation and risks of move-
ment using 31 pairs of coral habitats (see 
the schematic below). To move between 
corals, gobies must risk being eaten, 
and that risk increases with distance 
between corals. In emerald gobies, the 
likelihood of dispersal increased as the 
availability of suitable habitat increased, 
whereas it decreased as risks of move-
ment increased. Indeed, in these fish, 
the probability of nonbreeders moving 
between experimental corals is effec-
tively zero when they are just one meter 
apart, and corals are much further apart 
than this in nature. 
Taken together, these results indi-
cate that ecological constraints play 
an important role in the evolution of 
nonbreeding in coral reef fishes, just as 
they do in the evolution of nonbreed-
ing in birds and mammals. In coral 
reef fishes, however, it is nonbreeding 
and queuing that tend to go hand in 
hand (rather than nonbreeding and 
helping), because when an individu-
al’s independent breeding options are 
poor its only way to reproduce is to 
settle in a territory as a nonbreeder 
and wait to inherit a breeding position. 
Social Constraints in Coral Reef Fish
Future benefits and ecological con-
straints are sufficient to explain why 
individuals wait to inherit a breeding 
position rather than disperse to breed 
elsewhere. However, they do not pro-
vide the answer to another perplexing 
question: Why do individuals wait to 
inherit a breeding position rather than 
contest for a breeding position? One 
possibility is that individuals don’t 
contest for breeding positions because 
of social constraints (a concept directly 
analogous to the concept of ecological 
constraints), which might lower the 
reproductive payoff associated with 
To tease apart the costs of leaving a social group in coral-dwelling 
gobies, we manipulated distance between groups and numbers of 
nonbreeders. Longer distances between habitats posed a larger risk of 
predation during dispersal, and larger groups of nonbreeders posed a 
higher level of habitat saturation. The proportion of subordinates that 
disperse is highest (about 30 percent of nonbreeders) when distance and 
saturation is low, but we also observed some dispersal (about 15 percent 
of nonbreeders) when the distance was low but the habitat saturation 
was high. However, when the distance between habitats was larger (100 
centimeters), almost none of the nonbreeders chose to disperse.
To understand the benefits of staying in a 
group as a nonbreeder, we removed the male 
from groups of clown anemonefish to observe 
which nonbreeders filled the vacancy. In all 
cases, the largest resident nonbreeder filled it 
and successfully bred, demonstrating the ben-
efit of queuing to inherit a breeding position. 
Coral-dwelling gobies exhibit nearly identical 









































2014     July–August     295www.americanscientist.org
alternative actions within the group 
(see the sidebar “A New Evolutionary 
Framework for Cooperative Behavior” on 
page 297). 
An example of a social constraint 
would be the potential for inbreeding, 
emphasized by the behavioral ecolo-
gists Walter A. Koenig and Frank A. 
Pitelka, both then at University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, based on their studies 
of acorn woodpeckers (Melanerpes for-
micivorus), which live in family groups. 
If the only breeding positions that can 
be obtained by contesting would in-
volve mating with relatives, and in-
breeding has a low reproductive pay-
off, then selection may favor waiting 
to breed with a nonrelative rather than 
contesting to breed with a relative. The 
potential for inbreeding is just one fac-
tor that can be considered under the 
umbrella term social constraints, but 
there might be many types of social 
constraint, just as there are many types 
of ecological constraint. 
To determine whether the queuing 
behavior of clown anemonefish and 
emerald gobies might be favored be-
cause of social constraints, we began 
by thinking about what those con-
straints might be. During our yearlong 
field study of clown anemonefish we 
observed that dominant individuals 
occasionally evicted their immediate 
subordinates when the size differ-
ence between the two individuals was 
small. Further, we found that the size 
ratios between individuals adjacent in 
rank were not random. Rather, well-
defined size ratios occurred between 
individuals adjacent in rank, and these 
size ratios seemed to be maintained by 
subordinates regulating their growth 
(see graph at right). 
The idea that a vertebrate could 
regulate its growth in response to so-
cial context was flabbergasting and 
took (and still takes) many research-
ers in the field by surprise. Even now, 
we don’t understand exactly how the 
subordinates regulate their growth, 
although it seems to involve a self-
imposed reduction in food intake that 
one might call dieting or fasting, at 
least in the emerald gobies. The extent 
to which social birds and mammals 
adaptively modify their food intake, 
growth, and size in response to social 
context is unknown, although interest-
ing patterns have been documented in 
mole rats, meerkats, and humans. 
Putting the observations of eviction 
and well-defined size ratios together, 
In the absence of kin selection, the evolution of cooperative behavior de-
pends on current and future costs and benefits of cooperative or alternative 
actions: Selection may favor cooperative behavior because of its beneficial 
effects in the future (called future selection) or because of ecological con-
straints. The behavior favored by selection can be determined by an equa-
tion that we call the future rule. In particular, the cooperative action i will be 
favored over the alternative action j if 
Xi + fi Zi > Xj + fj Zj  
where Xi (or Xj) is the number of offspring associated with the individual’s 
ith (or jth) action, Zi (or Zj) is number of offspring associated with the indi-
vidual’s ith (or jth) action in the future, and f is the probability that those 
benefits will be realized. The f terms capture the effect of future selection; 
the j terms capture the effect of ecological constraints. The concept of future 
selection reveals why nonbreeding and helping behaviors might evolve in 
groups in the absence of kin selection.


























distribution of size ratios
In the clown anemonefish, the observed dis-
tribution of size ratios of individuals adjacent 
in rank (purple bars) is different from the dis-
tribution of size ratios expected under a null 
model (yellow bars). In particular, there is a 
lack of cases where individuals are similar in 
size (ratio of about 1.0) and an overabundance 
of cases where the dominant is about 25 per-
cent larger than its subordinate (ratio of about 
0.8). In the clown anemonefish, this pattern 
is maintained because subordinates regulate 
their growth when they approach the size of 
the dominant fish. (Figure adapted from P. M. 
Buston and M. A. Cant, Oecologia 149:362.)
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we formed three complementary hy-
potheses. First, selection would favor 
dominant individuals that evicted 
rather than tolerated subordinates who 
became too close in size—otherwise 
the dominant would risk being over-
thrown.  Second, because of the threat 
of eviction, selection would favor sub-
ordinate individuals that regulate their 
growth and size. Third, because of the 
size differences maintained, selection 
would favor subordinate individuals 
that wait to inherit rather than contest 
for a breeding position. 
To determine whether the social 
constraint existed and whether the 
observed subordinate behavior was 
favored because of it, we used em-
erald gobies to test a critical predic-
tion of each of these hypotheses: First, 
the likelihood of dominants evicting 
subordinates would increase as they 
became more similar in size; second, 
subordinates would maintain a size 
difference with respect to their imme-
diate dominant that did not elicit evic-
tion; and third, the likelihood of a sub-
ordinate ascending in rank by queuing 
would be greater than the likelihood of 
ascending in rank by contesting. 
We tested these predictions by stag-
ing 56 contests between pairs of non-
breeders. Pairs of contestants were cho-
sen such that they fell into one of four 
categories (size ratio ≈ 0.85; size ratio ≈ 
0.90; size ratio ≈ 0.95; size ratio ≈ 1.0), 
where the size ratio is given by the size 
of the smaller individual (the subordi-
nate) divided by the size of the larger 
individual (the dominant). The paired 
contestants were released into a coral 
in which neither had prior residence. 
The outcome of each staged contest 
was scored as subordinate evicted, 
dominant evicted, or neither evicted.  
In support of the first prediction, 
we found that dominants were more 
likely to evict their subordinates as 
the size ratio of the contestants tended 
toward 1.0. In support of the second 
prediction, we found that the prob-
ability of subordinate eviction was 
minimized when the pair’s size ratio 
matched that which is maintained un-
der natural conditions (0.93). Finally, 
given the size ratio maintained under 
natural conditions, the probability of 
a subordinate ascending in rank by 
winning a contest is effectively zero, 
whereas the probability of ascending 
in rank by outliving at least one of its 
dominants is at least 0.66, assuming 
mortality rates are independent of 
rank (see the graph above).
Taken together, these results are one 
of the clearest demonstrations that in-
dividuals will adopt nonbreeding strat-
egies within a group because of a social 
constraint—in this case, the hidden 
threat of eviction. Since we published 
our findings, zoologists Tzo Zen Ang 
and Andrea Manica, both at University 
of Cambridge at the time, have report-
ed similar results in other coral reef fish 
societies. The role of social constraints 
in animal cooperation, particularly the 
role of hidden threats, is now an active 
and exciting area of research.  
A New Evolutionary Framework
Darwin highlighted the challenge that 
the nonbreeding and helping behav-
iors observed in insect societies pre-
sented for his theory of natural selec-
tion and, since then, generations of 
biologists have set about rigorously 
testing alternative hypotheses for why 
such cooperative behaviors might be 
favored by natural selection. 
From the mid-1960s through the 
mid-1990s, behavioral ecologists de-
veloped a framework for understand-
ing the evolution of nonbreeding and 
helping behavior. That framework em-
phasized that individuals might coop-
erate because their behavior provides 
indirect genetic benefits, and that in-
dividuals might not pursue alterna-
tive, noncooperative options outside 
of the group because of ecological 
constraints. That framework emerged 
from studies of cooperatively breed-
ing birds and mammals, leaving us to 
wonder how things would play out in 
other parts of the animal kingdom.
Our goal has been to test the gener-
ality of this evolutionary framework 
and to generate new insights by study-
ing complex societies of coral reef 
fishes. Our studies, along with those 
of many others, have enabled us to ex-
pand this framework. This framework 
emphasizes that individuals might 
cooperate because their behavior pro-
vides future genetic benefits, and that 
individuals might not pursue alterna-
tive, noncooperative options inside the 
group because of social constraints (see 
the sidebar “A New Evolutionary Frame-
work for Cooperative Behavior” on the op-
posite page).  
For natural selection to favor the evo-
lution of cooperative behavior via kin 
selection or future selection, individuals 
must be able to assess or enhance the 
probability of accruing the benefits of 
cooperation. This statement does not 
























subordinate evicts a dominant
dominant evicts a subordinate
By conducting contest experiments between pairs of nonbreeding coral-dwelling gobies, we 
found that the frequency of eviction of one fish increases as the body size ratio between the two 
individuals approaches 1.0. Subordinates have a slight chance of evicting their dominants (purple 
bars) when they are similar in size, but no chance of doing so when they are dissimilar in size. 
Dominants are more than twice as likely to evict their subordinates when they are similar in size 
than when they are dissimilar in size. Thus, eviction is a credible threat that enforces peaceful 
cooperation, via the subordinate’s regulation of their growth in body size. (Figure adapted from 
M. Y. L. Wong, et al., Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B 274:1093.)
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mean that individuals have to know the 
probability of sharing an allele identi-
cal by descent or the probability of an 
event occurring in the future. Rather, 
individuals must have a simple rule—
a kin recognition system or future rec-
ognition system—that enables them to 
assess these probabilities with a reason-
able degree of certainty and then act ac-
cordingly. There has been a lot of work 
on kin recognition systems; work on fu-
ture recognition systems is in its infancy 
and is a potentially fascinating avenue 
of research. 
We believe that expanding the evo-
lutionary framework to encompass 
four key concepts—kin selection, fu-
ture selection, ecological constraints, 
and social constraints—provides a 
more complete understanding of the 
diversity of nonbreeding and helping 
strategies observed in complex animal 
societies. Also, this expanded view 
reveals a path toward unification of 
studies of cooperation across the bio-
logical and social sciences.
The evolutionary framework for 
understanding cooperation presented 
here has a striking parallel in econom-
ic bargaining theory. An excerpt from 
University of Warwick economist Abhi-
nay Muthoo’s introduction to bargain-
ing theory helps illustrate this point:
Two main determinants of such 
(marital) negotiations are each 
individual’s outside and inside 
options. Their outside options are 
the payoffs that they obtain from 
divorce, which might, for exam-
ple, be their payoffs from being 
single, or from finding an alterna-
tive partner. Their inside options 
are their payoffs from remaining 
married but with generally unco-
operative behavior (such as con-
stant fights and arguments…).
In our expanded evolutionary frame-
work, the payoff associated with dis-
persing to breed elsewhere, which is 
influenced by ecological constraints, is 
directly analogous to the outside op-
tion in bargaining theory—the payoff 
associated with leaving a cooperative 
interaction. Similarly, the payoff associ-
ated with contesting to breed within 
the group, which is influenced by social 
constraints, is directly analogous to the 
inside option in bargaining theory—the 
payoff derived from behaving uncoop-
eratively within an interaction. 
Framed in the language of bargain-
ing theory then, our expanded evolu-
tionary framework becomes: Selection 
will favor individuals that engage in 
cooperative actions if the payoff as-
sociated with cooperation (which de-
pends on direct, indirect, and future 
genetic benefits) is greater than the 
payoff associated with either the non-
cooperative outside option (which de-
pends on ecological constraints) or the 
noncooperative inside option (which 
depends on social constraints). Al-
though the nonbreeding and helping 
behaviors observed in animal societ-
ies seem paradoxical, they make sense 
when one considers the alternative op-
tions available to individuals.
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Selection may favor cooperative behavior because of kin selection or fu-
ture selection; such behavior can be favored because of detrimental effects 
associated with alternative actions outside of the group (the ecological 
constraints) or inside the group (called social constraints). In particular, a 
cooperative action i will be favored over alternative noncooperative actions 
j and k if two inequalities are satisfied simultaneously: 
Xi + ri Yi + fi Zi  >  Xj + rj Yj + fj Zj
Xi + ri Yi + fi Zi  >  Xk + rk Yk + fk Zk  
where Xi (Xj or Xk) is the number of offspring associated with the individual’s 
ith (jth or kth) action in the present. Yi (Yj or Yk ) is the recipient individual’s 
number of offspring associated with the donor’s actions, and r is the probabil-
ity that the two individuals share a copy of a particular gene identical by de-
scent. Zi (Zj or Zk) is the number of offspring associated with the individual’s 
actions in the future and f is the probability that those benefits will be realized 
in the future. The r terms capture the effect of kin selection, and the f terms 
capture the effect of future selection. Likewise, the j terms capture the effect of 
ecological constraints, and the k terms capture the effects of social constraints. 
Taken together, the four concepts of kin selection, future selection, ecological 
constraints, and social constraints provide a more complete understanding of 
the diversity of cooperative strategies observed in complex animal societies.
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